Search

Viva Libya!

HUMAN RIGHTS | POLITICAL PRISONERS | WAR CRIMES

Category

AFRICOM

UNSMIL Praises NFSL’s Mohammad Magariaf, Whitewashes Failures and Crimes of the NATO Proxy Regime

Editorial Comment:

Here the UNSMIL casts off all concealment of its agenda, exposing  its political bias.

Their statement, unedited, is evidence of their true mission in Libya:  not to support “human rights” and a “democratic transition”, but to coerce, deceive and support the present criminal neo-colonial proxy regime that was neither desired, nor elected by the Libyan people.

UNSMIL praise the founder of the NFSL, Mohammad El-Magariaf  (See CIA Base Files on Covert Ops in Libya).  His primary mission was the assassination of Muammar Gaddafi.   UNSMIL’s open support for him is equivalent to their approval of the brutal murder of Muammar Gaddafi and the NATO campaign that brought down the Jamahiriya.  By their alliance, they are complicit in the crimes committed against the people of Libya, past and present.

It follows that UNSMIL also supports the current intelligence | NATO Gladio “B” operations in North Africa and the Middle East that use Libya as a strategic base.  In addition to waging war against neighboring nations and Syria, Al Qaeda – Gladio B operatives terrorize the Libyan population.

All this, with UNSMIL’s blessing.

Alexandra Valiente
Viva Libya 

In the spirit of fairness I wish to add the following comments as a prequel to this report.  They highlight the points made regarding current human rights violations, political prisoners, the political isolation law, collective punishment, ethnic cleansing, the plight of the displaced and security concerns.

‫ـــ ملخص كلمة طارق متري اليوم في الامم المتحدة

خلاصة ما جاء في كلمة السيد “طارق متري” عن ليبيا أمام الأمم المتحدة اليوم :-
-سلطة الدولة الليبية محدودة جداً على جنوب البلاد
-قضايا تاورغاء والمشاشية مثيرة لقلق الأمم المتحدة .
-توجد أصواتُ الآن تنادي بتدخل الأمم المتحدة في الترتيبات السياسية الليبية.
-قانون العزل السياسي في ليبيا تم فرضه ب”قوة” سلاح الميليشيات.
-لا ينبغي التقليل من المخاطر الحقيقية التي تهدد ليبيا ، وضعف القطاع الأمني بها.
-توجد اسئلة كبيرة عن جثث ومعتقلين ، قضية بني وليد ، قتل بالسجون ، وتعذيب “بمصراتة”
-الوضع الأمني في ليبيا لا يزال غير مستقر وهناك سجون غير شرعيه واعتقالات وتعذيب, واحتلال للوزارات من اجل إقرار قانون العزل.
-اهالي “الشرق” أهالي “برقة” في ليبيا من حقهم ان ينالو حكم (فدرالي) ..لان الغرب الليبي يستحوذ على السلطة.
-إدارة المرحلة الانتقالية في ليبيا يبدو أنها أصعب مما كنا نتخيل ، والليبيون لم يفقدوا الثقة والأمل والتحمل ، رغم أن الطريق إلى الديمقراطية لا يبدو سهلاً كما تخيلنا .
-لا ينبغي التقليل من المخاطر الحقيقية التي تهدد ليبيا ، وضعف القطاع الأمني بها.

الحركة الوطنية الشعبية الليبية
‫الامم المتحدة: ثلث السجون الليبية لا تتبع لسيطرة الدولةذكر المبعوث الخاص للأمين العام للأمم المتحدة إلى ليبيا طارق متري للصحفيين اليوم الأربعاء 19 حزيران/يوينو أن الأوضاع في السجون الليبية تبقى حرجة ويزيدها تعقيدا أن ثلث السجون تقريبا تقع تحت سيطرة الميليشيات المسلحة ولا تتبع للسلطات.
وأفاد متري خلال خطابه في جلسة مجلس الأمن بأنه من 7 إلى 8 آلاف سجين في ليبيا يقبعون في السجون دون توجيه تهم ضدهم، وعملية تسليمهم إلى السلطات تتم بشكل بطيء جدا.
وأضاف متري الذي ترأس بعثة الأمم المتحدة لدعم ليبيا أنه “في بعض السجون كنا شهود عيان على التعذيب الذي يتعرض إليه السجناء ونملك أدلة على وجود حالات وفاة السجناء بسبب ذلك”.
ومن بين التهديدات التي تقف أمام الحكومة الليبية حدد مبعوث الأمم المتحدة مسألة حماية الحدود الدولية التي تتسلل عبرها، كما في السابق، كميات كبيرة من الأسلحة، وكذلك أزمة الإدارة الحكومية. وارتباطا بهذا أشار متري إلى الإعلان من طرف واحد في 1 حزيران/يونيو عن الحكم الذاتي الجزئي للمحافظة الليبية الشرقية برقة.‬
اخبار المقاومة الليبية 24/24(الاستخبارات الليبية)
‫مبعوث الامم المتحده في ليبيا يقدم تقريره اليوم الي مجلس الامن
قدم مبعثوث الامم المتحده طارق متري تقريره اليوم لمجلس الامن بنيويورك
وقد لخض المبعوث تقريره بان الوضع الأمني في بنغازي متردي جداً وهناك في ليبيا
سجون غير شرعيه واعتقالات وتعذيب,واحتلال للوزارات من اجل إقرار قانون العزلالسياسي
الذي لو طبق في ليبيا سوف يضعف المؤسسات, وهناك انقسام كبير في ليبيا بسب هذا
القانون بما فيه القضاء الذي يرفض هذا القانون, وليبيا محتاجة الي حوار وطني”‬
الحركة الوطنية الشعبية الليبية
‫السيدات والسادة المهتمين بالشأن الليبى
خلال جلسة مجلس الامن رقم 6981 بتاريخ 18 يونيو 2013 قدم السيد طارق مترى مطالعته الاعتيادية الربع السنوية الى مجلس الامن حول الاوضاع فى ليبيا , ومن خلال تحليلنا لكلمة السفير مترى يمكن لنا الاطلاع على الاتى .
1- تطرق الى الاحداث المأساوية خلال يوم 8 مايو 2013 فى بنغازى والتى قامت بها تشكيلات درع ليبيا والتى سقط خلالها متظاهرون سلميين بالرصاص , لكنه لم يذكر هنا العدد الفعلى للقتلى ( 42 شخص ) والذى كان ذكره سيوضح للمجلس حجم المأساة التى تعرض لها المتظاهرون والتى سمتها هيومن رايتس ووتش ( أحداث السبت الاسود ) .
2- اوضح السيد مترى هنا أن هذه التشكيلات تتبع للاوامر المباشرة لرئيس الاركان , مما يؤكد هنا المسئولية القانونية والسياسية لرئيس الاركان الذى دفع ثمنا سياسيا بان اقيل من منصبه , ولكنه أيضا حر وطليق ولم يحال الى اية لجنة تحقيق ولم تتخذ بحقه أية أجراءات قضائية حتى الان , وهو الامر الذى لم يتطرق اليه السيد مترى فى جريمة بهذا الحجم , وقد سبق لمجلس الامن ان أتخذ اجراءات لصالح اهالى بنغازى تحت نفس الظروف فى سنة 2011 عندما أحال المسئولين السياسيين والامنيين فى ليبيا الى محكمة الجنايات الدولية لارتكابهم جرائم بالقرار 1970 , ولم يطلب السيد مترى هنا أتخاذ أية أجراءات بحق المسئولين الحاليين سواء منهم السياسيين او الامنيين او المسئولين المباشرين .
3- أكد ألسفير مترى أن المؤتمر الوطنى أتخذ أجراءات عاجلة تجاه الاحداث فى بنغازى ولكنه فى نهاية الفقرة أشار ايضا الى أن هذه الاجراءات قد تكون غير ذات فعالية نظرا لرؤية الثوار , ما يعنى استحالة أتخاذ أجراءات حقيقية ضدهم .
4- أشار السيد مترى الى الحالة التى عاشها الواقع السياسى الليبى قبل وأثناء فرض قانون العزل السياسى بالقوة المسلحة , أن السفير مترى وهو يمثل الامين العام قد تأكد من حالة فرض القانون بالقوة والتى كانت ظاهرة لا تحتاج الى تأكيد ولكن المفارقة والمستغرب أن يعرض هذا الامر على مجلس الامن من طرف السفير مترى دون الاشارة الى ان الشرائع الدستورية و الفقه القانوني وحتى الاعراف تعتبر قانونا كهذا باطلا , بل ابلغ هنا المجلس بان هذا القانون سيقصى الكثير من الليبيين بمن فيهم معارضو القذافى السابقين فما بالك باطياف المجتمع الاخرى , وهو الامر الذى يدعونا للتساؤل هل السفير مترى اقترح شيئا على المجلس بالخصوص أم أنه فقط فى مهمة توضيح هذه الامور التى تنقل حتى عبر وسائل الاعلام , خاصة وان هذا القانون سيخلق اصطفافا جديدا فى ليبيا يهدد الاستقرار فيها .
5- السفير مترى قال على كل حال ان القانون قد تم اقراره , وهو ما يفهم منه ان بعثة الامم المتحدة و المجتمع الدولى وافق وغض النظر عن حالة كبرى فى ليبيا نتيجة لفرض الامر الواقع بالقوة , وهو ما يفهم منه أن سياسات فرض الامر الواقع بالقوة مقبولة وا ن با أمتعاض لدى السفير مترى ولدى المجتمع الدولى , وهو ما قد يفهم منه مختلف الاطراف فى ليبيا أن حالات أستخدام السلاح وفرض الوقائع بالقوة هى السياسة الناجحة .
6- أشار السفير مترى باقتضاب الى النصائح التى قدمها بخصوص العدالة الانتقالية والتى يبدو انه يرى أنها مازالت بعيدة عن التحقيق , وهو الامر الذى من شأنه أن يفاقم الاوضاع الامنية والسياسية المتردية منذ فترة نتيجة الاحتقان باسباب مختلفة ز
7- اشار السفير مترى الى حالات تقديم المشورة حول الحوار الوطنى الذى سينقذ ليبيا من دوامتها , ولكن لم يشر الى ان هذا العامل المهم قد توضحت فيه معالم بالامكان تنفيذها أم أنها مازالت بعيدة المنال .
8- اشار السفير مترى الى حالات الاعتقال فى السجون والتى لم تتحسن منذ مطالعته فى شهر مارس 2013 , وأشار ايضا الى عدد السجناء الذين مازالو ينتظرون توجيه الاتهام لهم و نقلهم الى السجون الرسمية , وأشار الى حالا الاعدام خارج القانون , والى حالات الاخفاء , والى حالات التعذيب , ولكنه هنا لم يقدم توصية بنوعية الاجراءات الدولية والقانونية بخصوص من يمارس حالات الانتهاك هذه , وهنا يمكننا القول ان هولاء المتورطين فى مثل هذه العمليات يشعرون أنهم بمنأى عن أية أجراءات دولية وقانونية و انسانية يمكن أن تتخذ ضدهم رغم المساحة القانونية الواسعة فى القرار 1970 لسنة 2011 وايضا التأكيدات الواردة فى القرار 2095 لسنة 2013 لجهة عدم الافلات من العقاب , ولجهة متابعة المتورطين فى الجرائم بغض النظر عمن هو الجانى ومن هو الضحية .
9- أشار السفير مترى الى الاسئلة التى بقيت من غير أجوبة بخصوص الجثث التى سلمت من مصراتة الى بنى وليد خلال شهر ابريل 2013 , ولم يوصى هنا السفير مترى بخطوات يمكن لمجلس الامن اتباعها مباشرة او عن طريق محكمة الجنايات الدولية للاجابة عن هذه الاسئلة , خاصة ان هذه القضية تتعلق بمكون رئيسى فى ليبيا وهو قبيلة الورفلة , التى قد تجد نفسها تبحث عن العدالة خارج مؤسساتها .
10- اشار السفير مترى الى مسألة المهجرين داخليا من قبائل تاورغاء والمشاشية وغيرهم , ولكنه ايضا لم يوصى مجلس الامن بأية خطوات يمكنه القيام بها لمكافحة هذا النوع المشين من الانتهاكات والذى سيكون دافعا لمزيد من التوترات الكبيرة فى ليبيا .
11- السفير مترى هنا اغفل مأساة أخرى ومهمة تتعلق بالاعداد الكبيرة جدا والمهمة من الليبيين المهجرون خارج ليبيا والظروف المأساوية التى يعيشونها فى بلاد التهجير القسرى وهو ما يعنى ان هولاء مازالوا خارج المواضيع المثارة , رغم الاصوات الاعلامية والسياسية المحلية والدولية التى ترتفع لايجاد حلول لهم .
12- ان الحديث عن الوضع الامنى فى الجنوب وضعف سيطرة الدولة عليه ماهو الا عينة فقط من المشاكل الامنية التى نشط تحت الرماد فى ليبيا , والتى يمكن ان تهدد وحدتها واستقرارها فى اى وقت .
13- أن الاشارة الى ضعف اجهزة الدولة الامنية بكل مستوياتها ليس فقط فى الجنوب بل حتى فى العاصمة طرابلس اصبح سمة للمجتمع الليبى والذى بدأت تكثر الاحاديث عنه خاصة عندما تحدث حسن الامين الرئيس السابق للجنة حقوق الانسان فى المؤتمر الوطنى والذى فر هاربا خارج ليبيا بعد ان تحدث عن ان مسئولين امنيين وزعماء مليشيات تتبع الحكومة متورطين مباشرة فى الجرائم و الانتهاكات .
14- لم يشر السفير مترى الى نشوء دولة داخل الدولة ( دولة مصراتة داخل الدولة الليبية ) والتى أصبح لديها قنصليات لدول غربية ويزورها السفراء وترفع على بواباتها الاعلام التى ترمز للدول فى اشارة لا تخفى على أحد , خاصة وأن السفير مترى يعرف جيدا و هو من لبنان الى أين يقود نشوء مثل هذه المكونات .
أن هذه القراءة البسيطة والتعليقات حول بيان السيد مترى امام مجلس الامن يمكن تلخيص مجملها فى ان الوضع السياسى والامنى فى ليبيا لن يكون بخير اذا لم يتخذ المجتمع الدولى والهيئات القضائية الدولية المسئولة عن الشأن الليبى خطوات جادة فى تحقيق العدالة للجميع , أن المجتمع الليبى يشكو الان من عدالة القوة والسلاح و يتطلع الى سلاح وقوة العدالة .
شكرا لكم

Briefing to the Security Council SRSG and Head of UNSMIL, Tarek Mitri – 18 June 2013

Mr. President,

1. On 8 June, Benghazi witnessed a tragic event, with a considerable loss of life, the greatest in east Libya since the Revolution. What started as a peaceful demonstration outside the barracks of an armed brigade in Benghazi deteriorated into an exchange of fire leaving many dead and wounded, mostly from the demonstrators. Protestors were calling for the Libya shield brigades, which comprise mainly revolutionary formations under the operational control of the Chief of General Staff of the Libyan Army, to be dismantled, and the army and police to be entrusted the role of exclusive security forces.

2. The Libyan authorities have taken swift action in the wake of the incident, transferring control of several brigade barracks in Benghazi to the Libyan Army. The General National Congress issued Decision 53 tasking the government to deal with armed groups that remain outside the control of the state, and to present immediately a proposal for the integration of armed brigades. The government responded promptly with a decision to proceed with the creation of a National Guard into which armed brigades would be integrated, but differences on the status of revolutionary brigades and their relationship with the state remain unresolved. The security situation in Benghazi deteriorated again on June 15. In what appears to be retaliation for the events of June 8, gunmen attacked an army base and the National Security Directorate. A number of Special Forces troops were killed. UNSMIL firmly condemned these attacks, as well as the previous ones, and called on all Libyans to rally around their legitimate institutions.

Mr. President,

3. I would like to briefly touch on the unilateral Declaration by the Transitional Council of Barqa on 1 June of a federal region in eastern Libya. The leadership of the Transitional Council of Barqa have justified this move by what they perceive as the central government’s failure to address security and governance issues in their region. While it is difficult to gauge popular support for federalism in the eastern and southern regions of Libya, the calls for genuine decentralization and better distribution of national resources can not be ignored. It may not be coincidental, therefore, that the Prime Minister announced on June 5 the decision to relocate the headquarters of four major state-owned companies from Tripoli to Benghazi.

Mr. President,

4. When I last briefed the Council in March, I noted a growing polarisation on the Libyan political scene manifested, most particularly, in the disagreement over a proposed law on political isolation and the related attempts to undermine the authority of the democratically elected bodies and legitimate state institutions.

5. It is undeniable that the law on political isolation garnered significant political support over the past months. It demanded the exclusion of figures associated with the former regime and others who had committed human rights violations, from public office. But deliberations over the law were divisive. There was disagreement on the scope of exclusionary measures and their criteria.

6. Commencing on 28 April, a number of revolutionary groups laid siege to several government ministries in an attempt to force through the adoption of the law. These actions had been preceded in March with the storming of the General National Congress and the assaults on some General National Congress members, including a shooting incident which targeted then President el-Magariaf. This escalation in exerting pressure set a dangerous precedent in its resort to the use of military force in order to extract political concessions.

7. The political isolation law was adopted on 5 May. However, the siege of ministries continued for a few more days and more political demands were voiced. A growing popular discontent, and a commitment of Prime Minister Zeidan to address some of the numerous demands, helped put an end to a show of force that threatened the stability of the country. Mr. Zeidan announced his intention to reshuffle his cabinet. Two ministers have resigned and have been replaced, so far.

8. The adoption of the Political Isolation Law will have far-reaching repercussions on the political process and the public administration. The Law lists a wide range of political, administrative and other posts, and defines types of affiliation and conduct, as a basis for the exclusion of individuals from public life for ten years. Proposals that the Law include provisions for exempting persons on the basis of their support to the Revolution were rejected.

9. Despite his distinguished record in active opposition to the Qadhafi regime over three decades, Mohammad El-Magariaf would have been excluded from office, in application of the law. He chose to resign as President of the General National Congress on 28 May. I would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to Mr. El-Magariaf’s leadership of the Congress since its inauguration, and express appreciation and gratitude for his support to the UN’s role in Libya and his confidence in UNSMIL and in me since I took up my duties as Special Representative of the Secretary-General. We also owe him a word of praise and respect for his dignified statesmanship as he distanced himself from the Libyan political scene.

10. Written advice was provided to the General National Congress on international standards, best practices and potential risks of exclusionary measures. The current law falls short of these standards in a number of areas. We believe many of the criteria for exclusion are arbitrary, far-reaching, at times vague, and are likely to violate the civil and political rights of large numbers of individuals.

11. In the context of Libya’s transition and the legacy of weak state institutions, the implementation of the law risks further weakening of those institutions. On 5 June, the day the law came into force, many prosecutors and judges went on strike in protest at some of the provisions of the law which they believe would affect them.

12. These developments demonstrate the urgency of adopting a transitional justice law anchored in truth-seeking, accountability and reparations. A draft law is currently being considered by the General National Congress. UNSMIL continues to advise on its scope and implementation.

13. In addition, UNSMIL stands ready to assist Libyan authorities in the technical aspects in conducting investigations and trials as part of the transitional justice process. This is particularly significant in the context of the recent decision by the International Criminal Court pre-trial chamber regarding Saif al-Islam Qadhafi which is the subject of a Libyan appeal. We shall continue also to affirm the importance of cooperation of the Libyan authorities with the International Criminal Court.

Mr. President,

14. Throughout the political crisis, my team and I increased engagement with all parties concerned, underlining the need for dialogue as a means of defusing tensions and ensuring respect for the democratic process. Following an initial encouragement from the Government, and requests from revolutionaries of diverse persuasions, UNSMIL initiated a series of discussions to facilitate direct talks between the two sides. We stand ready to continue providing our good offices.

15. The political and security challenges that now face the country may well be the legacy of decades of authoritarian rule, dysfunctional state institutions and confusion around political norms. This reality invites a national political dialogue that seeks consensus on the priorities for the transitional period. This is a message that I have repeatedly conveyed to Libyan authorities at the highest levels, political leaders and revolutionary figures. UNSMIL has already provided the Government and the leadership of the General National Congress with advice on issues and modalities of a national dialogue. We stand ready to facilitate this process, if so requested by the Libyan authorities.

16. In our conversations with various actors we also touched on the perceived, as well as the desired, role of the United Nations in Libya. This was all the more necessary in view of an unanticipated controversy around this role following the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2095 (2013). The said controversy surfaced in concomitance with the national political crisis. There were voices that casted doubts on the intentions of the international community and attributed to the United Nations an interventionist design. The fact that resolution 2095 was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter raised increased misunderstanding, suspicion and disquiet. On the other extreme of the political spectrum, there were voices calling for a more robust UN presence and reminding Libyans, or warning them, that Chapter VII indicated the gravity of international concern. In such a context, we needed to concentrate efforts on dispelling misperceptions and false expectations fuelled by a formidable flow of disinformation.

Mr. President,

17. In preparation for the election of the Constitutional Drafting Assembly, the United Nations, in close cooperation with the re-established High National Election Commission, facilitated discussions between a wide range of Libyan decision and opinion makers on issues such as electoral systems, voter registration and the participation of women. Through these discussions, Libyans of various political hues recognized the importance of designing a fair, inclusive and credible process. Offering technical advice and drawing on best practises, including the July 2012 national elections in Libya. UNSMIL also highlighted the significance of adopting special measures meant to enhance women’s participation in the Constitution Drafting Assembly.

Mr. President,

18. In the forthcoming period, leading to the elections of the 60 member Assembly, civic education and facilitation of debates on constitutional issues will have to be a priority. In this respect, UNSMIL, has a meaningful role to play. It is welcome by our Libyan partners and preparatory work is well underway.

19. Conflict-related detentions remain mostly unchanged since my last briefing to the Council. An estimated seven to eight thousand detainees still await to be charged or released. The process of transferring detainees to the authority of the state moves slowly. In Bani Walid, the scene of armed conflict last October, unanswered questions continue to surround the cases of bodies handed over by Misrata in April. In a number of detention centres, we have observed cases of torture. There is also evidence of deaths in custody due to torture.

20. UNSMIL has persistently emphasized that practises of extra-judicial killing and torture should not be tolerated in Libya, more particularly by those who were victims of injustice and repression under the previous regime. The national consensus on the centrality of promoting human rights shall not allow any justification of these violations.

21. UNSMIL continues to work closely with the Ministry of Justice, various prison authorities and local civil society to improve the situation of prisons. There have been variable degrees of success, particularly in providing medical care to inmates.

22. Legislative initiatives undertaken in April, are worthy of appreciation. The General National Congress passed a law criminalizing torture, enforced disappearances and discrimination as well as a law clarifying the jurisdiction of the civilian and military justice systems and abolishing the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians. We also welcome the tabling of a new law intended to provide assistance to women victims of sexual violence.

Mr. President,

23. UNSMIL remains concerned about the situation of migrants in Libya. The conditions inside these centres remain deplorable. UNSMIL and UN agencies will continue to offer their humanitarian support to those vulnerable groups and urge the government and local authorities to address problems effectively and in full respect of the dignity and rights of immigrants.

24. The plight of internally displaced persons, some 35,000 Tawerghans as well thousands of Mashashiyans and others, continues to be a major concern. The unilateral announcement by Tawerghan community leaders of their intention to return to their hometown on 25 June is a move fraught with risks. While UNSMIL continues to support in principle the Tawerghans’ right of return to their homes in safety and dignity, it is essential that all parties concerned create acceptable conditions for the exercise of their right. To this effect, we have intensified our efforts, emphasizing the need to establish a fact-finding mechanism integral to transitional justice.

Mr. President,

25. Border security remains a clear priority for Libya, and for its neighbours, and the wider international community. Recent developments in the Sahel region underscore the importance of effective border security and management. Despite official pronouncements by the Libyan authorities, severe capacity limitations result in little practical progress to date.

26. Government efforts to address border security necessitate the development of a comprehensive national strategy, addressing issues of integration of revolutionaries, improving inter-agency coordination, training, operational effectiveness, and infrastructure in the southern border region. Libya will also need to engage further in dialogue with its neighbours and its international partners.

27. Parallel to this effort, more is expected from the Government to accelerate the implementation of development projects in the south, a region whose communities have suffered from marginalisation far too long. Prime Minister Zeidan recently visited the south and made promises to move forward in reconstruction and development.

Mr. President,

28. The continuing weak state of security sector institutions, coupled with the lack of effective national security coordination, comes at a time when security incidents throughout the country, have grown in number and scale. Progress on Libya’s plans agreed at the International Ministerial Conference in Paris in February this year has stalled, in part because of the political crisis that ensued since. Inter-ministerial coordination on national security architecture struggled to show meaningful dividends.

29. In April, UNSMIL presented ‘Towards a Defence White Paper’ to the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff for their consideration. This joint effort by the Ministry of Defence, the Libyan Armed Forces and UNSMIL, includes 52 recommendations for a future Libyan defence strategy, and 18 immediate priorities.

Mr. President,

30. The Libyan state’s ability to fully assert its authority over the south, continues to be limited. We believe the Libyan authorities still have the opportunity to step up their efforts to effectively counter threats emanating from the south. Crucial to this effort, will be the support and assistance of Libya’s international partners, and the cooperation of its regional neighbours.

31. More broadly, we have learned from our experience in Libya over the past 21 months, that a piecemeal approach to state-building falls short of achieving good results, particularly in the security sector where the needs are huge and immediate.

Mr. President,

32. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya, along with the rest of the UN country team, will continue to support Libya’s democratic transition in accordance with our mandate, assisting in the constitution-making process and providing the technical assistance needed for a national election thereafter. But we must also recognise that Libya’s democratic transition does not stop with the attainment of these objectives. In fact, it goes well beyond the confines of our mandate.

33. The risks in Libya should not be underestimated, and by the same token, the opportunities should not be overlooked. Judging by the speed with which last year’s elections to the General National Congress took place so soon after the cessation of hostilities, we would be forgiven if we thought that the road to democracy was as simple as it appeared. As important as these elections may have been in ushering in the beginnings of a new political process and the building of legitimate state institutions, the Libyan people will continue to endure for the foreseeable future the heavy legacy bequeathed to them over decades of brutal rule. Managing the transition is bound therefore to be difficult.

Mr. President,

34. The mood in Libya today may have changed since I last briefed the Council in March. Despite the gravity of some of the security and political developments that have taken place over the course of the last three months, Libyans have not lost confidence. Many of them remain unwavering in asserting the principles that underpinned their Revolution, and their desire to build a modern and democratic state, based on the separation of powers, respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Thank you.

UNSMIL

Lies That Killed The Colonel

Editor’s Note:


Muammar Gaddafi
Libya: UN HDI Country Profile
The UN Praised Libya And Muammar Gaddafi For Human Rights Achievements
Libya Fact Sheet

Sirte

Alexandra Valiente
Libya 360°

*Stan Winer
Axis of Logic

Dawn revealed an extraordinary sight in the Libyan coastal city of Sirte on the morning of 20 October 2011 – “extraordinary” that is if you disregard the fact that nothing could have been ordinary in a once beautiful city that now lay in ruins after weeks of continuous bombing and shelling by Nato and its surrogate rebel forces. Stiff resistance by loyalist snipers together with a clear lack of coordination and divisions among rebel forces at the front had effectively halted the rebel advance.

The rebel force, little more than an assembly of armed street hooligans, was rife with internecine disputes, untrained in tactics, and adept only at firing their weapons into the air and praising Allah, when not actually shooting each other, Although loyalist forces were encircled in a residential area of about 700 square yards, about 150 loyalist army snipers supported by armed civilian volunteers were directing accurate fire at the rebels from surrounding buildings. In an illustration of how fiercely defended the loyalist position was, it took the anti-Gaddafi rebels a full two days to capture a single residential building as the Nato-backed rebels continued taking heavy casualties.

Nothing short of a tactical nuclear weapon would have been able to dislodge the firmly entrenched loyalist resistance, and that would have entailed unacceptable civilian casualties or “collateral damage” as the military fondly refers to it. In sum, the rebels were unable to capture Colonel Moammar Gaddafi or defeat remnants of the Libyan Army and its high command. The battle of Sirte was at stalemate, preventing Libya’s new leaders from declaring full victory in the eight-month civil war and causing significant military and political embarrassment to Nato.

But now, on this fateful morning of 20 October, white flags are flying at multiple locations across District Two of the besieged and devastated town, signifying at least a temporary unarmed truce. In the preceding days loyalist commanders and tribal elders, with the knowledge of rebel commanders, had been negotiating a safe passage for loyalist forces and families from Gaddafi’s tribe, who make up the majority of Sirte’s population, to leave the battered and besieged city.

The only precondition for this to happen, according to rebel commander Touhami Zayani of the El-Farouk brigade leading the attack on Sirte , was for loyalists to lay down their arms. Since nobody could move freely or safely around the embattled city, the negotiations would have been conducted mainly by satellite phone, meaning that Nato intelligence, through its electronic surveillance and communications interception systems, would have been fully aware of the negotiations and the truce terms under discussion.

According to Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam as quoted on the official resistance website Libya SOS, the last time he contacted his father a few hours before the convoy was attacked, his father assured him he had received assurances “from Americans” allowing him safe passage out of Sirte to the south of Libya without prosecution or bombing. We may never know for certain what exactly happened next, but the official version released by Nato from its operational base in Naples the following day reads as follows:

At approximately 08h30 local time (GMT+2) on Thursday 20 October 2011, NATO aircraft struck 11 pro-Qadhafi military vehicles which were part of a larger group of approximately 75 vehicles maneuvering in the vicinity of Sirte. These armed vehicles were leaving Sirte at high speed and were attempting to force their way around the outskirts of the city. The vehicles were carrying a substantial amount of weapons and ammunition posing a significant threat to the local civilian population.

The convoy was engaged by a NATO aircraft to reduce the threat. Initially, only one vehicle was destroyed, which disrupted the convoy and resulted in many vehicles dispersing and changing direction.

After the disruption, a group of approximately 20 vehicles continued at great speed to proceed in a southerly direction, due west of Sirte, and continuing to pose a significant threat. NATO engaged these vehicles with another air asset. The post strike assessment revealed that approximately 10 pro-Qadhafi vehicles were destroyed or damaged.

At the time of the strike, NATO did not know that Qadhafi was in the convoy. NATO’s intervention was conducted solely to reduce the threat towards the civilian population, as required to do under our UN mandate. As a matter of policy, NATO does not target individuals.

We later learned from open sources and Allied intelligence that Qadhafi was in the convoy and that the strike likely contributed to his capture.

NATO does not divulge specific information on national assets involved in operations.

That’s the official version. The unofficial version, less bland and based on information less widely circulated at the time, is somewhat more revealing.

Unofficial version

A total of 50 private security personnel, including 19 South Africans, had been recruited to travel to Libya on instructions to neutrally escort Colonel Gaddafi and his entourage from Sirte to southern Libya or over the border to Niger. On arrival in Libya the contract personnel – some would say mercenaries — travelled by road from Tripoli in a column of about 25 vehicles to rendezvous with Gaddafi and his entourage at a specified location in Sirte, without once being stopped or questioned at rebel roadblocks or security checkpoints.

A South African member of the neutral escort, in interviews with the South African Afrikaans language newspaper Rapport on 24 and 29 October, described how he and other private security personnel forming the escort had been given the impression that Nato “wanted Gaddafi out of Libya”, as part of a negotiated peace deal; but as things turned out, it became clear to him that Gaddafi had been set up as a target for assassination.

The neutral and unarmed convoy had assembled at the rendezvous point during the night of 19/20 October, but as dawn broke the vehicles came under Nato air attack. This was not a sustained attack but more in the nature of a warning shot across the bows, to remind the convoy commanders they were under constant surveillance. The Canadian commander of Nato operations Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard later admitted Nato’s concern that the departing loyalist force from Sirte would “join with the remnants of forces from Bani Walid and move into another desert area”, meaning apparently an area not earlier agreed upon in the truce conditions.

About 20 minutes after Nato’s aerial warning shot, the convoy commanders decided to take advantage in the lull of Nato air activity and make a run for it – only to again come under fire at a traffic roundabout on the outskirts of the city. As Bouchard later described it, this attack was designed to break the convoy into “manageable chunks”. And so it did: the convoy split up with vehicles heading in separate directions before coming under a third and final air attack. The vehicles in which Gaddafi and his closest advisors were travelling headed straight into the arms of the waiting rebel Misrata brigade.

Human Rights Watch visited the site where Muammar Gaddafi was captured, and there it found the remains of at least 95 people who had died that day. The vast majority had apparently died in the fighting and Nato strikes prior to Gaddafi’s capture, but between six and ten of the dead appeared to have been executed at the site with gunshot wounds to the head and body. Some of the bodies were burnt beyond recognition. Nato never did explain why only about 25 damaged or burnt-out convoy vehicles were found at the sites of the attacks, whereas earlier Nato had publicly claimed the existence of 75 vehicles in the convoy. But then Nato never has been noted for accuracy or for setting the record straight.

Astonishingly, according one of the private security personnel who survived the attack, the rebel forces regarded captured members of the escort amicably as “allies”. All the surviving contract personnel were released immediately after the ambush while one of the escort party who had been wounded in the ambush was swiftly transported to Cairo for medical attention. Significantly, this was at a time when real or perceived “mercenaries” elsewhere were ruthlessly being hunted down and slaughtered by rebel forces.

“Protecting secrets”

National Transitional Council (NTC) spokesman Ibrahim Betamal, in an interview with GlobalPost after Gaddafi was executed, stated unashamedly that Gaddafi had been “shot by one of his own snipers. He died from these wounds. They killed him to protect secrets … I believe this sniper was placed with Gaddafi to kill him if he was captured.” NTC leader Mustafa Abdel-Jali, addressing world media, repeated more or less the same grotesque claim that Gaddafi had been killed by his own people. Abdel-Jamal’s version differed only to the extent that Gaddafi had been killed “during the clashes with his supporters while arresting him.” The NTC had “formed a committee to investigate how Gaddafi was killed,” Abdel-Jali informed the world media. This so-called committee never did materialize.

There was neither examination of ballistic and forensic evidence nor any identification of objective eyewitnesses. Gaddafi’s body was buried at a secret location somewhere in the desert, and many unanswered questions about his death remain buried with him to this day. But one fact is indisputable: the colonel was sadistically tortured before being killed. Cell phone videos taken by bragging rebels at the scene, and which soon found their way onto the news website GlobalPost, showed a blood bespattered Gaddafi, barely alive, being barbarically raped with a stick or knife by his captors. Then he was wounded at close range with a gunshot to the stomach, and died some time later of a gunshot to the head.

The mainstream media, while exultantly parroting the official version that Gaddafi had been killed “by his own supporters while attempting to escape”, was careful not to mention anything about an unarmed truce, about torture by rape, or about the convoy travelling in broad daylight whereas it is common sense that any bid to escape would have been carried out under cover of darkness to avoid detection. Nor was there any photographic evidence or any other convincing evidence of the convoy having being “armed” as claimed falsely by Nato and dutifully regurgitated by the media.

None of the media queried how 50 foreign contract security personnel traveling in convoy from Tripoli had managed to avoid being challenged at roadblocks and security checkpoints along the way, and then cross the frontline at Sirte and openly assemble in a free-fire zone subject to continuous Nato air and satellite surveillance. The fact that these issues are not public knowledge says a lot about the mainstream media.

Nor did the mainstream media ever bother to remind anyone that a white flag is meant to signify to everyone concerned that a truce is called and an approaching party is unarmed, as prescribed in the Geneva and Hague protocols of international humanitarian law, which prohibit the killing or injuring of persons outside of combat and doing so constitutes a major war crime.

Almost everything reported hysterically by the mainstream Western media about the Libyan civil war has been proved wrong, in particular the media myth emanating from NTC sources that opposition to Gaddafi was a peaceful movement when “10,000 opposition protestors were killed in Benghazi by Gaddafi’s government.” The reality, as established independently by Amnesty International, was that the rebellion, far from being a peaceful movement, had been armed from the very first day of the uprising; and 10,000 people had not been killed in Benghazi by Gaddafi’s government at that time but 110 killed on both sides at the outset of hostilities prior to NATO’s intervention on the pretext of “protecting civilians”.

“Demented terrorist”

There are a few others things about Gaddafi that are either studiously avoided or grossly distorted by a Western media long obsessed with demonizing the colonel — their favourite pejoratives being “tyrant”, “despot”, “ruthless dictator”, “demented terrorist”, “embezzler” and so on. They purposefully ignore what this despised “tyrant” really gave to Libya. He had inherited the poorest country in the world and turned it into one of the richest in Africa, providing the country with the highest Human Development Index on the continent. He provided Libyans with free electricity, with literacy and free education, and paid for university grants. Ten percent of Libyan students studied abroad, paid for by the Libyan state, board and lodging included. He granted gender equality to Libyan women; gave every newly married couple US$50,000 to set up home; paid for half their first car; provided interest-free bank loans; provided free medical assistance; built the world’s most advanced water supply and irrigation system; and provided farmers with land, seeds, tools and instruction.

Gaddafi helped free Africans from foreign domination, exploitation, imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism; he supported generously the cause of pan-Africanism through funding of the Organisation of African Unity; he financed Africa’s first communications satellite, the Regional African Satellite Communication Organization (RASCOM) satellite, thus freeing Africans from exorbitant payments to western communications monopolies; he approved equitable foreign loan agreements so that Africans could be freed from paying excessive interest to foreign banks; he paid annual revenue from oil directly into the bank accounts of ordinary Libyan citizens.

That’s what the tyrant Gaddafi did for Libya and for Africa.

It did not endear him to the West nor to Islamic fundamentalists and some of the Arab world’s more autocratic and ideologically backward reactionaries.

In the meantime, until America, Britain and France declassify secret intelligence documents detailing the sequence of events leading up to and including the assassination of Colonel Gaddafi — and they are unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future — we will never know the full circumstances of the “tyrant’s” capture, torture and execution. In the meantime, the contents of this present article are no less suasive and somewhat more inclusive than what has been selectively spoon-fed to us by the Western mainstream media and by Qatar’s al-Jazeera in their conduct of crimes against reality.

*Source

Additional research by Adam Larson, Petri Krohn and others

REFERENCES

Rebel casualties, stalemate, siege of Sirte

United Press report 19 September 2011

Reuters report 27 September 2011

Reuters report 6 October 2011, Sirte:

Associated Press/CBS report 20 October 2011

Sirte, truce negotiations

Reuters report 27 September 2011

White flags in Sirte

Gaddafi flying white flag when killed

American promise of safe passage:

Eyewitness account of South African contract soldier/mercenary: Rapport newspaper, 22 October 2011

Rapport newspaper, 29 October 2011

Convoy composition, intelligence sources quoted, 3 November 2011

NTC spokespersons Betamal and Abdel-Jalil, after Gaddafi execution: Guardian online, 24 October 2011

GlobalPost, 22 October 2011

Torture by sodomy, rebel video: GlobalPost 24 October 2011

Nato commander Bouchard quotes: Al-Jazzera 24 October 2011

Why Nato Intervention Is Not A Victory For Responsibility To Protect

Institute for Security Studies

There is a moral consensus on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as a framework for ending mass atrocities. The portrayal of the NATO intervention in Libya as a ‘victory’ for R2P is however likely to do more harm than good.

A Google search on the NATO-led intervention in Libya and (R2P) produces almost two million hits. This highlights the popularity and significance of the discourse on the practice of R2P that has remained dominant especially since the NATO intervention in Libya.

Acknowledgement must be made to the constellation of institutions, individuals and governments that ensured sustained efforts to re-define sovereignty as responsibility. Notably, the 2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) crystallised the concept and built on the idea of (R2P). Also, the 2005 endorsement of R2P by United Nations (UN) member states during the historic Outcome Summit represented both a moral and political re-affirmation of the expedient need to protect populations at risk of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Yet, the question of how to intervene, especially in decisions requiring the use of force without the consent of the target state, remains contested and controversial. Prior to the NATO intervention in Libya, most supporters of R2P sustained its momentum through placing more emphasis on the preventive and non-coercive elements of R2P. For example the 2009 United Nations Secretary General’s Report on the Implementation of R2P underscored the centrality of non-coercive preventive action as a less controversial and more effective way of operationalising R2P.

The UNSCR 1973 on Libya is significant in two main respects. First, it authorised the first UN sanctioned military operation since the 1991 Gulf War. There are widespread claims that this resolution represented the implementation of R2P through the use of force. In contrast, specific use of R2P language was made in UNSCRs on Libya (1970 and 1973) and Côte d’Ivoire (1975) to emphasize the primary role of the states and parties to the conflict in the responsibility to protect civilians. The justification for military intervention in Libya, as contained in UNSCR 1973, was premised on the protection of civilians (PoC) as opposed to specific reference to R2P.

While there may be areas of convergence between the conception and practice of R2P and PoC, their relationship remains deeply contentious and unresolved. Second, UNSCR 1973 and the consequent NATO military intervention in Libya was contrary to the conventional belief that the great powers had either failed to act or had acted too late in situations of impending or actual mass atrocities.

Rather than a victory for R2P, the execution of NATO intervention in Libya may have re-validated a traditional criticism against humanitarian intervention as a mask for the power aspirations of great powers. Specifically, the disproportionate use of force by NATO in Libya for civilian protection-cum-regime change has been severally criticised.

It resonates the prudence by international politics expert Ken Booth that international society is governed by “western governments and a variety of local strongmen which bear an uncomfortable resemblance of a global protection racket”. The rectitude of ‘saving strangers’ from mass atrocities in Benghazi appeared to be overshadowed by the self-serving interests of France, Britain, the United States and some Arab league member states in getting rid of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi by all possible means.

The emerging negative consequences of the NATO-led intervention in Libya have further strengthened the resistance against Western (humanitarian) intervention in Africa. There are three main strands in which these negative consequences are discernible, namely at the internal, regional and global levels. Internally, there is a growing escalation of tribal tensions within Libya that were expressed by sceptics on the eve of, and during the NATO-led intervention. The former Gaddafi regime ruled Libya for over four decades through the deliberate absence of state institutions.

The vacuum left in the wake of Gaddafi’s death is beginning to create an expansion of alternatively governed spaces fuelled by a ‘liberated’ state with no monopoly or control over the use of force. For example, in southern Libya, in towns such as Kufra and Sebha, there have been tribal clashes between the Toubou, perceived as being pro-Gaddafi tribesmen, and local brigades loyal to the National Transitional Council (NTC). Recent clashes have recorded an estimated 147 deaths and more than 300 injuries. This development has raised fears of protracted conflicts in southern Libya and a possibility of semi-autonomy in the eastern region of Benghazi. Human rights organisations have also expressed concerns about the absence of respect for rule of law, particularly in the treatment and prosecution of pro-Gaddafi supporters by the NTC.

Closely connected to the crisis within post-intervention Libya is the emergence of regional security threats. The historical use of southern Libya as a safe haven for rebels from Chad, Niger and Sudan has increased the likelihood of regional instability. It remains to be seen how these countries will be affected by the increased violence in southern Libya.

Notwithstanding, there is already evidence of instability in the Sahel region, fuelled by the Libyan crisis. The relative military success by the Tuareg rebels in Northern Mali and the consequent military coup by the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and the State (Comité Nationale pour le Redressement de la Democracy de l’Etat) is best understood against the backdrop of intense militarisation of the region caused by pro-Gaddafi supporters fleeing Libya with massive military arsenals.

Finally, the implication of the NATO-led intervention for global governance can be seen from various perspectives. First, there is already regression and strong opposition from states (especially China and Russia) for more ‘humanitarian’ intervention elsewhere.

A notable example was the use of the UNSC veto by China and Russia, intended to protect Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad regime from actions championed by Britain, France and the United States. Second, the question of double standards in decisions regarding intervention has re-surfaced. Apart from the Libyan crisis, there are/were similar uprisings in some Arab states such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, where there is less appetite for a Western-led military operations.

It should be recalled that the initial formulation of the R2P by the ICISS was partly to achieve a political consensus on how to prevent such selectivity. Finally, there may have been a setback in the modest gains achieved in the promotion of cooperation between the African Union (AU) and international organisations such as NATO, the European Union and the UN.

In a recent international research symposium, jointly organized by the Institute for Security Studies and the Research Division of the NATO Defense College on AU-NATO Collaboration in Addis Ababa, there was a marked absence of top-level AU officials. It was construed by several observers as an expression of the indignation, distrust and fractures in the operational relationship between the AU and NATO. It may also reflect a likelihood of stalled progress in current cooperation (as the case of Somalia demonstrates) and, aspiration towards political coherence between the AU and the UN.

There is certainly a universal state of mind with regard to preventing and responding effectively to mass atrocities. For those who continue to see NATO intervention in Libya as a fulfilment of R2P, history and the course of time must serve as the ultimate judge and jury to determine whether this is so.

Jide Martyns Okeke, Senior Researcher, Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Division, ISS Addis Ababa

Globalist’s Amnesty International & Chatham House Think It’s Time To Reign In Militias?

NATO’S Craven Cover-Up Of Its Libyan War Crimes

Vijay Prashad

A new UN report strongly suggests that the rush to a NATO ‘humanitarian intervention’ might have been made on exaggerated evidence, and that NATO’s own military intervention might have been less than ‘humanitarian’ in its effects.

Ten days into the uprising in Benghazi, Libya, the United Nations’ Human Rights Council established the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya. The purpose of the Commission was to ‘investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in Libya.’ The broad agenda was to establish the facts of the violations and crimes and to take such actions as to hold the identified perpetrators accountable.

On June 15, the Commission presented its first report to the Council. This report was provisional, since the conflict was still ongoing and access to the country was minimal. The June report was no more conclusive than the work of the human rights non-governmental organizations (such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch). In some instances, the work of investigators for these NGOs (such as Donatella Rovera of Amnesty) was of higher quality than that of the Commission.

Due to the uncompleted war and then the unsettled security state in the country in its aftermath, the Commission did not return to the field till October 2011, and did not begin any real investigation before December 2011. On March 2, 2012, the Commission finally produced a two hundred-page document that was presented to the Human Rights Council in Geneva. Little fanfare greeted this report’s publication, and the HRC’s deliberation on it was equally restrained.

Nonetheless, the report is fairly revelatory, making two important points: first, that all sides on the ground committed war crimes with no mention at all of a potential genocide conducted by the Qaddafi forces; second, that there remains a distinct lack of clarity regarding potential NATO war crimes. Not enough can be made of these two points. They strongly infer that the rush to a NATO ‘humanitarian intervention’ might have been made on exaggerated evidence, and that NATO’s own military intervention might have been less than ‘humanitarian’ in its effects.

It is precisely because of a lack of accountability by NATO that there is hesitancy in the United Nations Security Council for a strong resolution on Syria. ‘Because of the Libyan experience,’ the Indian Ambassador to the UN Hardeep Singh Puri told me in February, ‘other members of the Security Council, such as China and Russia, will not hesitate in exercising a veto if a resolution – and this is a big if – contains actions under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which permits the use of force and punitive and coercive measures.’

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

The Libyan uprising began on February 15, 2011. By February 22, the UN Human Rights Chief Navi Pillay claimed that two hundred and fifty people had been killed in Libya, ‘although the actual numbers are difficult to verify.’ Nonetheless, Pillay pointed to ‘widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population” which “may amount to crimes against humanity.’ Pillay channelled the Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN from Libya, Ibrahim Dabbashi, who had defected to the rebellion and claimed, ‘Qaddafi had started the genocide against the Libyan people.’ Very soon world leaders used the two concepts interchangeably, ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity.’ These concepts created a mood that Qaddafi’s forces were either already indiscriminately killing vast numbers of people, or that they were poised for a massacre of Rwandan proportions.

Courageous work by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch last year, then much later the 2012 report from the UN belies this judgment, (as does my forthcoming book ‘Arab Spring, Libyan Winter’, AK Press), which goes through the day-by-day record and show two things: that both sides used excessive violence and that the rebels seemed to have the upper hand for much of the conflict, with Qaddafi’s forces able to recapture cities, but unable to hold them.

The UN report is much more focused on the question of crimes committed on the ground. This is the kind of forensic evidence in the report:
(1) In the military base and detention camp of Al Qalaa. ‘Witnesses, together with the local prosecutor, uncovered the bodies of 43 men and boys, blindfolded and with their hands tied behind their backs.’ Qaddafi forces had shot them. Going over many of these kinds of incidents, and of indiscriminate firing of heavy artillery into cities, the UN Report notes that these amount to a war crime or a crime against humanity.
(2)  ‘Over a dozen Qadhafi soldiers were reportedly shot in the back of the head by thuwar [rebel fighters] around 22-23 February 2011 in a village between Al Bayda and Darnah. This is corroborated by mobile phone footage.’ After an exhaustive listing of the many such incidents, and of the use of heavy artillery against cities notably Sirte, the UN report suggests the preponderance of evidence of the war crime of murder or crimes against humanity.

There is no mention of genocide in the Report, and none of any organized civilian massacre. This is significant because UN Resolution 1973, which authorized the NATO war, was premised on the ‘the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population’ which ‘may amount to crimes against humanity.’ There was no mention in Resolution 1973 of the disproportionate violence of the thuwar against the pro-Qaddafi population (already reported by Al-Jazeera by February 19), a fact that might have given pause to the UN as it allowed NATO to enter the conflict on the rebels’ behalf. NATO’s partisan bombardment allowed the rebels to seize the country faster than they might have had in a more protracted war, but it also allowed them carte blanche to continue with their own crimes against humanity.

With NATO backing, it was clear that no one was going to either properly investigate the rebel behaviour, and no-one was going to allow for a criminal prosecution of those crimes against humanity. Violence of this kind by one’s allies is never to be investigated as the Allies found out after World War 2 when there was no assessment of the criminal firebombing of, for example, Dresden. No wonder that the UN Report notes that the Commissioners are ‘deeply concerned that no independent investigation or prosecution appear to have been instigated into killings committed by thuwar.’ None is likely. There are now over eight thousand pro-Qaddafi fighters in Libyan prisons. They have no charges framed against them. Many have been tortured, and several have died (including Halah al-Misrati, the Qaddafi era newscaster).

The section of the UN report on the town of Tawergha is most startling. The thirty thousand residents of the town were removed by the Misratan thuwar. The general sentiment among the Misratan thuwar was that the Tawerghans were given preferential treatment by the Qaddafi regime, a claim disputed by the Tawerghans. The road between Misrata and Tawergha was lined with slogans such as ‘the brigade for purging slaves, black skin,’ indicating the racist cleansing of the town. The section on Tawergha takes up twenty pages of the report. It is chilling reading. Tawerghans told the Commission “that during ‘interrogations’ they were beaten, had hot wax poured in their ears and were told to confess to committing rape in Misrata. The Commission was told that one man had diesel poured on to his back which was then set alight; the same man was held in shackles for 12 days.’ This goes on and on. The death count is unclear. The refugees are badly treated as they go to Benghazi and Tripoli.

To the Commission, the attacks against Tawerghans during the war ‘constitute a war crime’ and those that have taken place since ‘violate international human rights law’ and a ‘crime against humanity.’ Because of the ‘current difficulties faced by the Libyan Government,’ the Commission concludes, it is unlikely that the government will be able to bring justice for the Tawerghans and to undermine the ‘culture of impunity that characterizes the attacks.’

NATO’S CRIMES

For the past several months, the Russians have asked for a proper investigation through the UN Security Council of the NATO bombardment of Libya. ‘There is great reluctance to undertake it,’ the Indian Ambassador to the UN told me. When the NATO states in the Security Council wanted to clamor for war in February-March 2011, they held discussions about Libya in an open session. After Resolution 1973 and since the war ended, the NATO states have only allowed discussion about Libya in a closed session. When Navi Pillay came to talk about the UN Report, her remarks were not for the public.

Indeed, when it became clear to NATO that the UN Commission wished to investigate NATO’s role in the Libyan war, Brussels balked. On February 15, 2012, NATO’s Legal Adviser Peter Olson wrote a strong letter to the Chair of the Commission. NATO accepted that the Qaddafi regime ‘committed serious violations of international law,’ which led to the Security Council Resolution 1973. What was not acceptable was any mention of NATO’s ‘violations’ during the conflict,

‘We would be concerned, however, if ‘NATO incidents’ were included in the Commission’s report as on a par with those which the Commission may ultimately conclude did violate law or constitute crimes. We note in this regard that the Commission’s mandate is to discuss ‘the facts and circumstance of….violations [of law] and…crimes perpetrated.’ We would accordingly request that, in the event the Commission elects to include a discussion of NATO actions in Libya, its report clearly state that NATO did not deliberately target civilians and did not commit war crimes in Libya.’

To its credit, the Commission did discuss the NATO ‘incidents.’ However, there were some factual problems. The Commission claimed that NATO flew 17,939 armed sorties in Libya. NATO says that it flew ‘24,200 sorties, including over 9,000 strike sorties.’ What the gap between the two numbers might tell us is not explored in the report or in the press discussion subsequently. The Commission points out that NATO did strike several civilian areas (such as Majer, Bani Walid, Sirte, Surman, Souq al-Juma) as well as areas that NATO claims were ‘command and control nodes.’ The Commission found no ‘evidence of such activity’ in these ‘nodes.’ NATO contested both the civilian deaths and the Commission’s doubts about these ‘nodes.’ Because NATO would not fully cooperate with the Commission, the investigation was ‘unable to determine, for lack of sufficient information, whether these strikes were based on incorrect or outdated intelligence and, therefore, whether they were consistent with NATO’s objective to take all necessary precautions to avoid civilian casualties entirely.’

Three days after the report was released in the Human Rights Council, NATO’s chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen denied its anodyne conclusions regarding NATO.  And then, for added effect, Rasmussen said that he was pleased with the report’s finding that NATO ‘had conducted a highly precise campaign with a demonstrable determination to avoid civilian casualties.’ There is no such clear finding. The report is far more circumspect, worrying about the lack of information to make any clear statement about NATO’s bombing runs. NATO had conducted its own inquiry, but did not turn over its report or raw data to the UN Commission.

On March 12, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon went to the UN Security Council and stated that he was ‘deeply concerned’ about human rights abuses in Libya, including the more than eight thousand prisoners held in jails with no judicial process (including Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, who should have been transferred to the Hague by NATO’s logic). Few dispute this part of the report. The tension in the Security Council is over the section on NATO. On March 9, Maria Khodynskaya-Golenishcheva of the Russian Mission to the UN in Geneva noted that the UN report omitted to explore the civilian deaths caused by NATO. ‘In our view,’ she said, ‘during the NATO campaign many violations of the standard of international law and human rights were committed, including the most important right, the right to life.’ On March 12, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused NATO of ‘massive bombings’ in Libya. It was in response to Lavrov’s comment that Ban’s spokesperson Martin Nesirky pointed out that Ban accepts ‘the report’s overall finding that NATO did not deliberately target civilians in Libya.’

NATO is loath to permit a full investigation. It believes that it has the upper hand, with Libya showing how the UN will now use NATO as its military arm (or else how the NATO states will be able to use the UN for its exercise of power). In the Security Council, NATO’s Rasmussen notes, ‘Brazil, China, India and Russia consciously stepped aside to allow the UN Security Council to act’ and they ‘did not put their military might at the disposal of the coalition that emerged.’ NATO has no challenger. This is why the Russians and the Chinese are unwilling to allow any UN resolution that hints at military intervention. They fear the Pandora’s box opened by Resolution 1973.

Libya: US Africa Command Receives Joint Meritorious Unit Award For Operations

NATO War Crimes
NATO – Operation Unified Protector
Legal Template For Filing War Crimes Charges Against Nations And Officials Involved In The War Against Libya

U.S. Africa Command was awarded a Joint Meritorious Unit Award for its response to the conflict in Libya between March 19 and March 30, 2011, when staff members coordinated humanitarian and military operations to maintain stability in the region.

During a ceremony prior to the start of an all-hands meeting, March 9, 2012, General Carter Ham, commander of U.S. Africa Command, and Chief Master Sergeant Jack Johnson Jr., U.S. AFRICOM’s senior enlisted leader, attached a Joint Meritorious Award ribbon onto the command’s flag. The award recognized U.S. Africa Command’s successful execution of Operation Odyssey Dawn, in support of United Nation’s Security Council Resolution 1973, which demanded an end to the violence by the Qadhafi regime against citizens. (See Statement by General Ham on commencement of military strikes in Libya).

The Joint Meritorious Award is awarded in the name of the U.S. Secretary of Defense to joint activities for “meritorious achievement or service, superior to that which is normally expected, for actions in the following situations: combat with an armed enemy of the United States, a declared national emergency, or under extraordinary circumstances that involve national interests.”

In response to growing turbulence across North Africa, the command rapidly coordinated and led interagency and 10 partner nations engaged in humanitarian and military operations to maintain stability within the region. Through this partnership, Africa Command preserved critical infrastructure by directing 813 U.S. Air Mobility missions that delivered 2,362 short tons of cargo and offloaded over 17 million pounds of fuel supporting coalition efforts. Additionally, this international effort established a no-fly zone over Libya, and enforced an arms embargo at sea.

According to the award citation, “The [U.S. AFRICOM] staff’s diligent efforts directly contributed to restoring and maintaining regional security and stability.”

The award presentation took place on the one-year anniversary of the date that Ham took charge of U.S. Africa Command. Following the ceremony, Ham reflected on U.S. AFRICOM’s accomplishments over the past year and reviewed upcoming changes affecting staff members.

Expressing his gratitude for staff members, Ham said, “One year to the day and just to sum it up, I couldn’t be more proud,” Ham said. “There’s no place that I’d rather be than right here, right now, and there’s no team I’d rather be with than this team.”

United States Africa Command

In Violation of UNSC Res 1973, NATO Forces Led Ground Assault On Tripoli

IN VIOLATION OF UNSC RES 1973 NATO FORCES LED THE GROUND ASSAULT ON TRIPOLI
STOP NATO

Sergei Balmasov
Pravda

Italy’s L’Espresso daily publication wrote that NATO’s special forces played the key role in taking Tripoli, the capital of Libya. A participant of the operation shared his impressions with the publication. According to the author of the article, the man, whose story the newspaper published, was struggling with the [eventual] butchers of Muammar Gaddafi, foreign snipers and killers who had come to Libya from all over the world. According to him, all of them came to Tripoli to make money by aiming their guns at rebellious people.

The man, who introduced himself as a member of the Italian special forces, said that the secret weapon had been aimed against inexperienced rebels for months. “Those snipers stopped the first groups of the rebels, who entered the Libyan capital,” the man said.

The author of the article admitted that bombs and missiles were useless against them. The residents of Tripoli did not struggle with them to avoid massacre in return. “There was only one way to remove them – to challenge them to a duel: a shooter vs. a shooter. This is exactly what NATO did. They gathered the best snipers of the alliance under the conditions of extreme secrecy and brought them to Libya to get rid of the regime there. It was their weapons that contributed most to the fall of the dictatorship. It was they who opened the road for the rebellion. There were Italian servicemen among them too,” the article said.

L’Espresso published the story told by Ale, a serviceman of the special forces of the Italian navy, who supposedly took part in the taking of Tripoli. According to the author of the article, Ale and his partners were working in the south-east of Tripoli. The men were equipped with Ar 15 guns with silencers of the new generation and state-of-the-art sniper rifles for high-precision gunfire for a distance of up to a thousand meters. Their equipment also included comfortable shoes and clothing: body armor with extra protection on the chest, cartridges, containers for water, medications and medical equipment neatly packed in the uniforms, etc.

“When Ale and his men arrived at the front, they took perfect positions. They could control the whole square from the height that they had taken. The snipers had to be removed before daybreak. Ale’s men had already detected two enemy snipers with the help of electronic devices. Ale determined the target and said that he was ready. The enemies were quiet. They would take several shots before changing positions. That was a lethal mistake for them to make. The night was drawing to its end. It was time to move to another bunker of Gaddafi’s supporters to open the door for the revolution wider.”

Stories like these make one think about the real participation of NATO troops in the Libyan war. According to official information from the alliance, NATO conducted bombings, restricted arms shipments, and assisted in training the forces who were struggling against Gaddafi’s troops.

There is also unofficial information which was exposed by the British media. According to British publications, Britain, for instance, went far beyond the framework set by the UN. The country supposedly participated in at least restricted operations in which it suffered considerable losses.

The above-mentioned article in the Italian newspaper also said that Ale was a member of the special team in which there was also a French legionary, a Briton from SAS and two US marines. All of them were veterans, whose skills were far better than those of Gaddafi’s mercenaries.

According to the author, the use of those snipers became a critical element like a nuclear bomb in 1945, which changed the course of the conflict.

NATO sources said that there were as many as 4,000 US marines deployed near the Libyan shores during the operation. White House officials say that those marines did not take part in the Libyan “revolution.” Was it really so?

It is worthy of note that there were reports saying that Gaddafi’s soldiers downed helicopters with NATO commandos on board. It was also reported that the Libyan army had captured European mercenaries during the standoff.

The West uses professionals against unwanted regimes. However, the above-mentioned stories also mean that the West is ready to use its pros against other regimes as well – in Syria, Iran, etc. Foreign special services reportedly continue to sound out the possibilities for the Libyan scenario to repeat in Syria. There are also reports saying that mysterious snipers attack demonstrators and policemen to provoke armed clashes. Will Teheran and Damascus be able to set anything against mercenaries and commandos who are capable of changing the course of any conflict?

Create a free website or blog at WordPress.com. | The Baskerville Theme.

Up ↑

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 1,644 other followers